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PLEA AGREEMENTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTRACTS* 
COLIN MILLER** 
In his dissenting opinion in Ricketts v. Adamson, Justice 
Brennan proposed the idea of plea agreements as constitutional 
contracts and lamented the fact that the Supreme Court had yet to 
set up rules of construction for resolving plea-deal disputes. Since 
Adamson, courts have given lip service to Justice Brennan’s 
dissent and applied his reasoning in piecemeal fashion. No court 
or scholar, however, has attempted to define the extent to which a 
plea agreement is a constitutional contract or develop rules of 
construction to apply in plea-deal disputes. This gap is 
concerning given that ninety-five percent of criminal cases are 
resolved by plea agreements. 
This Article is the first attempt to defend the concept of plea 
agreements as constitutional contracts and establish a core rule of 
construction to guide judges in interpreting plea bargains. It 
advances the thesis that due process requires that courts treat 
pleading defendants at least as well as parties to other contracts, 
meaning all of the protections associated with contract law 
should be incorporated into plea-bargaining law through the 
Due Process Clause. 
This Article then argues that incorporation of one of these 
protections—the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing—would lead to legal reform in three plea-bargaining 
scenarios where pleading defendants are treated worse than 
parties to other contracts: (1) substantial assistance motions, (2) 
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In his 1987 dissenting opinion in Ricketts v. Adamson,1 Justice 
Brennan proposed the idea of plea agreements as constitutional 
contracts: 
This Court has yet to address in any comprehensive way the 
rules of construction appropriate for disputes involving plea 
agreements. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the law of 
commercial contract may in some cases prove useful as an 
analogy or point of departure in construing a plea agreement, 
or in framing the terms of the debate.2 
In the thirty years since Adamson, courts have given lip service 
to Justice Brennan’s dissent and applied his reasoning in piecemeal 
fashion in cases involving disputes over plea bargains. No court or 
scholar, however, has ever attempted to develop clear rules of 
construction to apply in plea-bargaining disputes. This gap in the law 
is surprising and concerning given that approximately ninety-five 
percent of criminal cases in this country are now resolved by plea 
agreements.3 
This Article is the first attempt to establish a core rule of 
construction to guide judges in interpreting plea bargains. It advances 
the thesis that due process requires that courts treat pleading 
defendants at least as well as parties to other contracts, meaning that 
all of the protections associated with contract law should be 
incorporated into plea-bargaining law through the Due Process 
Clause. This Article then argues that incorporation of one of these 
contract law protections—the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing—would lead to legal reform in three key plea-bargaining 
scenarios where pleading defendants are treated worse than parties to 
other contracts. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I of this Article 
provides a brief history of plea bargaining. Part II analyzes Justice 
Brennan’s dissent and advances the theory of plea agreements as 
 
 1. 483 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 2. Id. at 16 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 3. State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa 2013). 
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constitutional contracts. Finally, Part III argues that this theory would 
result in substantial reform to three key plea-bargaining scenarios: (1) 
substantial assistance motions, (2) Brady disclosures, and (3) 
prosecutorial presentation of sentencing recommendations. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING 
In the United States, “plea bargaining did not occur with any 
frequency until well into the nineteenth century.”4 Toward the end of 
the nineteenth century and through the beginning of the twentieth 
century, plea bargaining became “a dominant method of resolving 
criminal cases” at the same time that there was a substantive 
expansion of criminal law.5 In the decades following the 1920s, plea 
bargaining became an even more central part of the criminal justice 
system, despite disapproval by scholars and the press.6 
The major reason for this disapproval was the fact that plea 
bargaining occurred in an informal and clandestine manner.7 There 
was “a ritual of denial that any promises ha[d] been made, a ritual in 
which judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel .	.	. participated.”8 As 
a result, there was “a lack of effective judicial review of the propriety 
of the agreements, thus increasing the risk of real or apparent 
unfairness.”9 
The first attempt to regulate plea bargaining came in 1946, when 
Congress promulgated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.10 At 
the time, Rule 11 simply stated that a judge should not accept a guilty 
plea “without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge.”11 In 1966, the Supreme 
Court amended Rule 11 to prohibit a judge from accepting a guilty 
plea “without first addressing the defendant personally and 
determining the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the 
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.”12 
Despite the Supreme Court’s amendment to Rule 11, the Court 
itself noted that it was not until its 1971 opinion in Santobello v. New 
 
 4. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 
(1979). 
 5. Id. at 6. This expansion was largely the result of Prohibition. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 amendment. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1946) (amended 1966); see also State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 
46, 51 (Iowa 2013). 
 11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1946) (amended 1966). 
 12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1966) (amended 1974). 
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York13 “that lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the practice 
were finally dispelled.”14 In Santobello, the Court recognized that 
there would need to be a significant expansion in the number of 
judges and court facilities if every criminal charge were taken to 
trial.15 Therefore, the Court concluded that “[t]he disposition of 
criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the 
accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an essential 
component of the administration of justice.”16 As such, “[p]roperly 
administered, it is to be encouraged.”17 
Since Santobello, plea bargaining has become the predominant 
method of resolving criminal charges in this country. Currently, about 
ninety-five percent of criminal cases that are not dismissed are 
resolved with plea bargains.18 This shift to plea bargaining has led 
scholars to bemoan the death of the jury trial.19 
II.  PLEA AGREEMENTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTS 
The 1987 Supreme Court case Ricketts v. Adamson highlighted 
the fact that there have never been rules of construction created for 
plea agreements, but it did not define the extent to which commercial 
contract law informs plea-bargaining law. Nonetheless, subsequent 
precedent, including Supreme Court precedent, makes clear that 
defendants entering into plea agreements should be treated at least as 
well as parties entering into commercial contracts. 
In Adamson, the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to 
determine the extent to which the Constitution informs the question 
of whether the prosecution breached a plea agreement. A majority of 
the Court, however, failed to answer the question. 
A. Ricketts v. Adamson 
In Ricketts v. Adamson, a reporter for the Arizona Republic was 
killed when a dynamite bomb exploded under his car, and the State 
charged John Adamson with first-degree murder in connection with 
 
 13. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
 14. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (discussing the holding of Santobello, 
which established the necessity of the practice of plea bargaining). 
 15. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa 2013). 
 19. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Due Process Without Judicial Process?: 
Antiadversarialism in American Legal Culture, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2249, 2249 (2017). 
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the crime.20 Adamson later entered into a plea agreement, pursuant 
to which he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for 
his testimony against Max Dunlap and James Robison, who were also 
allegedly involved in the murder.21 Specifically, the plea deal stated in 
relevant part that “[s]hould the defendant refuse to testify or should 
he at any time testify untruthfully .	.	. then this entire agreement is 
null and void and the original charge will be automatically 
reinstated.”22 
Adamson thereafter testified against the two other men, who 
were convicted of first-degree murder.23 Pursuant to the plea 
agreement, the court then sentenced Adamson to 48 to 49 years’ 
imprisonment, “with a total incarceration time of 20 years and 2 
months.”24 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Arizona 
reversed the convictions of Dunlap and Robison based upon 
Confrontation Clause violations.25 
Before retrial, the State informed Adamson that it intended to 
call him as a witness against the two men pursuant to his plea 
agreement.26 Defense counsel responded by sending a letter to the 
prosecutor indicating that Adamson believed his obligations under 
the plea agreement ended when he was sentenced.27 The State 
countered with its own letter stating that it believed Adamson to be in 
breach of his plea agreement.28 When the State thereafter called 
Adamson to testify at a pretrial proceeding in connection with the 
retrial of Dunlap and Robison, defense counsel told the judge about 
the prosecutor’s letter.29 As a result, the judge did not compel 
Adamson to answer the prosecutor’s questions at the proceeding.30 
The State followed up by filing a new first-degree murder charge 
against Adamson, who moved to quash the charge on double 
jeopardy grounds.31 The Supreme Court of Arizona eventually found 
that (1) Adamson breached the plea agreement, which contemplated 
his testimony at “retrial after reversal”; and (2) Adamson waived his 
 
 20. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 3 (1987). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 4. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. State v. Dunlap, 608 P.2d 41, 44 (Ariz. 1980); see also Adamson, 483 U.S. at 4. 
 26. Adamson, 483 U.S. at 4. 
 27. Id. at 4–5. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 5. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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double jeopardy objection under the terms of the plea agreement.32 
That said, the court concluded that the prosecution should have 
reinstated the initial first-degree murder charge rather than bringing a 
new first-degree murder charge; therefore, it remanded the case after 
it vacated Adamson’s second-degree murder conviction, reinstated 
the original first-degree murder charge, and dismissed the new first-
degree murder charge.33 At this point, Adamson offered to testify 
against Dunlap and Robison, but the prosecutor declined the offer.34 
Adamson was later convicted of first-degree murder and given the 
death penalty.35 
His appeal eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, 
which initially noted that “[u]nder the terms of the plea agreement, 
both parties bargained for and received substantial benefits.”36 The 
Court then found that the agreement made clear that Adamson 
“would have no double jeopardy defense” if he failed to hold up his 
end of the bargain.37 Because the United States Supreme Court 
agreed with its Arizona counterpart that Adamson breached the plea 
agreement, it found that he was not entitled to relief.38 
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Stevens, Justice Brennan began by noting that the entire case 
hinged on whether Adamson breached the plea agreement.39 He then 
used the following language: 
This Court has yet to address in any comprehensive way the 
rules of construction appropriate for disputes involving plea 
agreements. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the law of 
commercial contract may in some cases prove useful as an 
analogy or point of departure in construing a plea agreement, 
or in framing the terms of the debate. It is also clear, however, 
that commercial contract law can do no more than this, because 
plea agreements are constitutional contracts. The values that 
underlie commercial contract law, and that govern the relations 
between economic actors, are not coextensive with those that 
underlie the Due Process Clause, and that govern relations 
between criminal defendants and the State. Unlike some 
 
 32. Id. at 5–6. 
 33. Id. at 7. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 9. 
 37. Id. at 10. 
 38. Id. at 11–12. 
 39. Id. at 12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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commercial contracts, plea agreements must be construed in 
light of the rights and obligations created by the Constitution.40 
Justice Brennan next observed that both the Arizona and United 
States Supreme Courts merely assumed that Adamson breached the 
plea deal without analyzing the facts under commercial contract law.41 
He then argued that Adamson’s letter could not be a regular breach 
because the plea deal did not require Adamson to agree with the 
State’s interpretation of the plea agreement or refrain from sending 
such a letter.42 Further, Justice Brennan found that the letter was not 
an anticipatory breach of the plea deal because it merely advanced an 
alternative reasonable interpretation of the agreement and did not 
state a refusal to perform.43 
Justice Brennan determined that the majority’s opinion finding 
Adamson in breach was especially problematic because, “far from 
being a commercial actor, Adamson is an individual whose 
‘contractual’ relation with the State is governed by the 
Constitution.”44 Therefore, “[t]he determination of Adamson’s rights 
and responsibilities under the plea agreement is controlled by the 
principles of fundamental fairness imposed by the Due Process 
Clause.”45 As a result, granting “one party—here, the State—the 
unilateral and exclusive right to define the meaning of a plea 
agreement is patently unfair.”46 
Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that even if Adamson 
breached the plea agreement, the State had the duty, like a party to a 
commercial contract, to “take all reasonable steps to minimize the 
consequent damage.”47 According to Justice Brennan, while 
Adamson’s actions might have delayed the retrials of Dunlap and 
Robison and cost the State some litigation expenses, Adamson was 
now prepared to fulfill his end of the bargain.48 Therefore, the State 
could have been made whole by accepting Adamson’s testimony and 
exacting some minor penalty on Adamson, but a capital murder 
prosecution was too steep of a price.49 Justice Brennan found that (1) 
 
 40. Id. at 16 (citation omitted) (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.6 
(1977)). 
 41. Id. at 16–17. 
 42. Id. at 17. 
 43. Id. at 18. 
 44. Id. at 20. 
 45. Id. at 20–21. 
 46. Id. at 21. 
 47. Id. at 22. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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“[a] comparable result in commercial law, if one could be imagined, 
would not be enforced”;50 and (2) “[t]he fundamental unfairness in 
the State’s course of conduct here is even less acceptable under the 
Constitution.”51 
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion laid the groundwork for the 
concept of plea agreements as constitutional contracts. And yet, 
neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts have fleshed out the 
groundwork in the ensuing decades. 
B. Subsequent Case Law on Plea Agreements as Constitutional 
Contracts 
Given that Justice Brennan’s conclusion that “plea agreements 
are constitutional contracts” came in a dissenting opinion,52 it is 
unsurprising that most courts have not explicitly cited it in their 
opinions. Two federal circuit courts have cited this language from 
Justice Brennan’s dissent: the Third Circuit, in a dissenting opinion,53 
and the First Circuit, in noting that the defendant had not claimed 
prosecutorial breach.54 Three federal district courts have quoted the 
language as well, all in unpublished opinions.55 Finally, a handful of 
state courts have cited Justice Brennan’s dissent to find in favor of 
defendants.56 
While most courts have not explicitly cited Justice Brennan’s 
conclusion, the Supreme Court and all federal circuit courts,57 along 
 
 50. Id. at 23. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 16. 
 53. McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 2007) (Roth, J., 
dissenting). 
 54. United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 235 (1st Cir. 1989), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Rivera-Feliciano v. United States, 498 U.S. 954 (1990). 
 55. See Hughes v. Beard, No. 14-cv-01302-EMC, 2016 WL 126931, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 12, 2016); Holston v. Cate, No. 2:11-CV-00917-JKS, 2012 WL 6561729, at *6 (E.D. 
Cal. Dec. 14, 2012); United States v. Bell, Criminal Action No. H-07-271, 2008 WL 59188, 
at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2008). 
 56. See, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 742, 744 (Ky. 2013); State v. Louis, 
645 So. 2d 1144, 1148 (La. 1994). 
 57. See Cuero v. Cate, 827 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 4 (2017); 
United States v. Villa-Vazquez, 536 F.3d 1189, 1199 (10th Cir. 2008); McKeever, 486 F.3d 
at 97 (Roth, J., dissenting); United States v. Debreczeny, 69 F. App’x 702, 706 (6th Cir. 
2003); San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1075 (11th Cir. 1996); Margalli-Olvera v. 
INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 211, 216–17 (4th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Pelletier, 898 F.2d 297, 301–02 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1329 
(7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 18–19 (1st Cir. 1988); In re Geisser, 
627 F.2d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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with state supreme courts across the country,58 have found that plea 
agreements are governed or strongly influenced by contract law, with 
defendants also afforded the additional protection of the Due Process 
Clause. 
In its 2009 opinion in Puckett v. United States,59 the Supreme 
Court held that, “[a]lthough the analogy may not hold in all respects, 
plea bargains are essentially contracts.”60 According to the Court, 
under commercial law, “[w]hen the consideration for a contract 
fails—that is, when one of the exchanged promises is not kept—we do 
not say that the voluntary bilateral consent to the contract never 
existed, so that it is automatically and utterly void; we say that the 
contract was broken.”61 The Court applied this same analysis to plea 
agreements by analogy to commercial contract law, concluding that 
“it is hornbook law that misrepresentation requires an intent at the 
time of contracting not to perform.”62 
The Supreme Court is not alone. Courts across the country 
frequently apply commercial contract law principles to plea 
bargaining. For instance, “[c]ourts have generally considered contract 
defenses like unclean hands and lack of meeting of the minds in 
evaluating whether a plea agreement should be voided.”63 Courts 
have also applied the commercial contract law doctrines of mutual 
mistake of fact64 and frustration of purpose65 to void plea agreements 
and discharge the parties’ obligations under such agreements. 
Moreover, because it is the Due Process Clause that mandates 
the prosecution’s performance,66 many courts have placed a greater 
degree of responsibility on the government than they place upon 
criminal defendants and/or parties to private contracts. For instance, 
in United States v. Harvey,67 Michael Lee Harvey was charged with 
nine offenses related to drug smuggling and distribution operations.68 
Harvey subsequently pleaded guilty to one charge in exchange for the 
prosecution dropping the remaining charges and agreeing to the 
 
 58. See, e.g., Ex parte Johnson, 669 So. 2d 205, 207 (Ala. 1995); In re Lord, 94 P.3d 
952, 955 (Wash. 2004). 
 59. 556 U.S. 129 (2009). 
 60. Id. at 137. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 138 n.1. 
 63. Boswell v. Crews, No. 3:11cv352/RV/EMT, 2013 WL 1562940, at *20 (N.D. Fla. 
Feb. 25, 2013). 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 381 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1004–05 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 66. Ex parte Johnson, 669 So. 2d 205, 207 (Ala. 1995). 
 67. 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 68. Id. at 295. 
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following clause: “The Eastern District of Virginia further agrees not 
to prosecute MICHAEL LEE HARVEY for any other possible 
violations of criminal law arising from the offenses set out in the 
indictment or the investigation giving rise to those charges.”69 
Later, Harvey was indicted in connection with the same crimes in 
the District of South Carolina, and he moved in the Eastern District 
of Virginia for enforcement of the plea agreement and enjoinment of 
the South Carolina indictment.70 The Fourth Circuit agreed with 
Harvey, finding that the language was ambiguous as to whether the 
subject clause applied only in the Eastern District of Virginia or 
everywhere.71 
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit held that “both 
constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the 
Government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant 
(or possibly than would be either of the parties to commercial 
contracts) for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea agreements.”72 This 
language about possibly holding the prosecution to a higher standard 
than parties to a commercial contract has proven to be pretty popular. 
It has since been cited by four other federal circuit courts,73 four state 
supreme courts,74 and several federal district courts.75 
In addition to numerous courts applying Harvey, several courts 
have also found that defendants may be entitled to relief, even when 
prosecutors do not violate specific terms of plea agreements, due to 
“general principles of due process and prosecutorial responsibility.”76 
Additionally, courts have concluded that due process sometimes 
requires courts to deviate from normal contract law to provide further 
protection to criminal defendants entering into plea agreements.77 
Finally, courts have refused to apply some contract law principles 
to plea bargaining to protect the constitutional rights of defendants, 
 
 69. Id. at 295–96, 296 n.1. 
 70. Id. at 297. 
 71. Id. at 303. 
 72. Id. at 300. 
 73. See United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Clark, 218 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 399 
(6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1026–27 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 74. See People v. McClellan, 862 P.2d 739, 750–51 (Cal. 1993) (en banc); Cole v. State, 
922 A.2d 364, 377 (Del. 2007); State v. Langley, 369 P.3d 1005, 1010 (Mont. 2016); State v. 
Bisson, 130 P.3d 820, 828 (Wash. 2006) (en banc). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Oruche, 257 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 76. See, e.g., State v. Tyson, 189 N.C. App. 408, 416, 658 S.E.2d 285, 291 (2008). 
 77. See, e.g., McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81, 86 (3d Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 1990); Loveless v. State, 896 N.E.2d 
918, 921 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
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which seems consistent with the Puckett Court’s conclusion that the 
analogy between contract law and plea-bargain law may not hold in 
all respects.78 For example, in United States v. Barron,79 William Scott 
Barron, Jr. entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he 
pleaded guilty to several crimes, including possession of a firearm in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§	924(c)(1).80 Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that a defendant 
violates §	924(c)(1) only by “active employment” of a firearm in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime.81 Because Barron did not actively 
employ a firearm in his crime, he moved to set aside his conviction.82 
The government responded that the commercial contract principle of 
mutual mistake of law required rescission of the entire plea 
agreement.83 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that 
[a] plea bargain is not a commercial exchange. It is an 
instrument for the enforcement of the criminal law. What is at 
stake for the defendant is his liberty .	.	.	. The interests at stake 
and the judicial context in which they are weighed require that 
something more than contract law be applied.84 
The Ninth Circuit then noted that it had decided not to use the 
doctrine of mutual mistake of law to invalidate plea bargains in past 
cases before reaching the same conclusion in the case at hand.85 
While courts have mostly treated criminal defendants the same 
as or better than parties to normal contracts, there are exceptions. For 
instance, in Berryhill v. United States,86 the defendant sought to have 
his plea agreement voided because, inter alia, it was a contract of 
adhesion with the government not giving up anything of value.87 In 
response, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio acknowledged that contract law principles apply when a 
defendant claims that the government breached a plea agreement.88 
But the court noted that the defendant was trying to rescind portions 
of his plea agreement and concluded that “application of contract 
 
 78. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009). 
 79. 172 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 80. Id. at 1155. 
 81. Id. at 1156 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1158. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1158–59. 
 86. No. 1:15-cv-815, 2016 WL 2610258 (N.D. Ohio May 6, 2016). 
 87. Id. at *7. 
 88. Id. 
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principles to plea agreements does not extend so far as to allow courts 
to determine whether a contract was formed.”89 
Lower courts have also, in some cases, refused to import specific 
commercial contract law doctrines into plea bargaining. In Anderson 
v. Wainwright,90 the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida concluded that “a variant of promissory estoppel is 
not available to prevent an invalid plea proceeding from being a 
nullity, without legal effect.”91 Similarly, in State v. Smith,92 the Court 
of Appeals of Ohio denied a defendant relief because he was not able 
to cite “any authority applying the equitable doctrines of unjust 
enrichment or promissory estoppel in the context of an attempted 
plea agreement.”93 And, in State v. Reed,94 the Court of Appeals of 
Washington concluded, “[W]e do not believe the panoply of contract 
law can be appropriately transported, in toto, into criminal law” and 
thus doubted that “[c]ontract law doctrines such as severability, 
impracticability and quantum meruit” apply in the plea-bargaining 
context.95 Case law from jurisdictions around the country has created 
confusion and inconsistency as to the scope of plea bargains as 
constitutional contracts. 
C. Plea-Bargaining Criminal Defendants Should Be Treated at Least 
as Well as Parties to Other Government Contracts 
If plea agreements are constitutional contracts, we need to 
address the extent to which contract law informs plea-bargaining law. 
In other words, to the extent we have established that the Due 
Process Clause applies to plea bargaining, we next need to establish 
“what process is due.”96 This Article proposes that the Due Process 
Clause requires that courts treat pleading defendants at least as well 
as parties to other contracts, and specifically government contracts. 
Again, this should be a relatively palatable proposal, at least in 
the abstract. As noted, courts across the country have cited the 
Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in Harvey that “both constitutional and 
supervisory concerns require holding the Government to a greater 
degree of responsibility than the defendant (or possibly than would 
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be either of the parties to commercial contracts) for imprecisions or 
ambiguities in plea agreements.”97 Also, as noted, courts sometimes 
treat criminal defendants better than parties to commercial law 
contracts by refusing to apply certain commercial contract law 
doctrines, like mutual mistake of law, that could harm pleading 
defendants.98 Additionally, as the Seventh Circuit concluded in United 
States v. Cook,99 “A defendant who has signed a plea agreement has 
all the defenses he would have under contract law, plus some.”100 
However, as noted previously,101 and as will be discussed 
further,102 there are certain specific situations where courts treat 
pleading defendants worse than parties to other contracts, including 
government contracts. This treatment runs counter to the way that 
courts typically treat criminal defendants. Courts often use the Due 
Process Clause to confer greater rights upon criminal defendants than 
civil litigants. For instance, the Due Process Clause allows criminal 
defendants to present evidence that civil defendants could not 
introduce based upon the rape-shield rule.103 Moreover, the Due 
Process Clause is part of the rationale for a criminal defendant’s right 
to present a defense,104 which can trump the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in criminal, but not civil, cases.105 
Indeed, the common question for courts is the extent to which 
they need to use the Due Process Clause to extend criminal 
safeguards to civil and quasi-criminal litigants. In a trilogy of cases, 
the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause gives criminal 
defendants greater or equal rights than those given to civil litigants 
and can be used to determine which due process protections in 
criminal cases need to be imported into civil and quasi-criminal cases. 
The keystone case on the issue is Mathews v. Eldridge.106 In 
Eldridge, George Eldridge was awarded Social Security disability 
benefits in June 1968.107 In 1972, Eldridge indicated in a questionnaire 
that his condition had not improved, but the state agency monitoring 
 
 97. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986); see also supra text 
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 98. See supra text accompanying notes 78–85. 
 99. 406 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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97 N.C. L. REV. 31 (2018) 
2018] PLEA AGREEMENTS 45 
Eldridge’s condition preliminarily determined that his eligibility for 
benefits had ceased.108 The agency informed Eldridge that he could 
submit additional information pertaining to his condition, but he 
declined.109 Therefore, the agency made a final determination that 
Eldridge was no longer disabled, and the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) accepted that determination.110 The SSA 
notified Eldridge that he had six months to seek reconsideration, but 
he instead filed a lawsuit challenging the administrative procedures, 
which did not entitle him to an evidentiary hearing.111 
That lawsuit eventually reached the Supreme Court, which laid 
out the three factors it considers in determining the amount of 
process due to a litigant: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.112 
Applying these three factors, the Court concluded that Eldridge was 
not entitled to a hearing.113 
In Morrissey v. Brewer,114 which actually predated Eldridge, the 
Supreme Court reached a different result using a similar analysis.115 In 
Morrissey, two men were paroled after serving part of their 
sentences.116 Both men were subsequently arrested and had their 
parole revoked based solely upon parole officers’ reports and without 
parole revocation hearings.117 They then appealed, claiming that due 
process required a hearing.118 
Those appeals reached the Supreme Court, which began by 
noting “that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal 
prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in 
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such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.”119 According 
to the Court, this is because “[p]arole arises after the end of the 
criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence.”120 
The Court then proceeded to consider the three factors later 
crystalized in Eldridge. Under factor one, the private interest at stake, 
the Court found that a parolee has an interest in his continued liberty 
that is tempered by conditions of his parole that “subject[] him to 
many restrictions not applicable to other citizens.”121 Therefore, a 
parolee’s private interest is not much weaker than the private interest 
of a criminal defendant because “the liberty of a parolee, although 
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified 
liberty.”122 
Jumping to the third factor, the Court found that the prior 
conviction and imposition of conditions on a parolee creates “an 
overwhelming [government] interest in being able to return the 
individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary 
criminal trial if in fact he has failed to abide by the conditions of his 
parole.”123 That said, under the second factor, the Court concluded 
that there is a serious risk of erroneous deprivation of a parolee’s 
liberty interest without a hearing because parole boards might 
otherwise rely upon incomplete or incorrect facts.124 
Balancing these factors, the Court concluded that the State has 
no interest in revoking parole without at least some informal 
procedural guarantees.125 On the other hand, the Court found that 
there is no need for formalism in the parole-revocation context.126 
Therefore, the Court concluded that due process requires an informal 
parole revocation hearing to ensure a decision is based upon verified 
facts.127 
The Court reached a similar conclusion in its post-Eldridge 
opinion in Addington v. Texas.128 In Addington, Texas applied a 
preponderance of the evidence standard to civil commitment 
proceedings, and a committed individual appealed and claimed that 
the State should be required to prove the need for commitment 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.129 The Supreme Court found that a civil 
commitment is not as serious as a criminal conviction,130 but it also 
found that such a commitment constitutes a serious deprivation of 
liberty.131 As a result, the Court split the difference between the 
parties’ positions and declared that the State must prove the need for 
civil commitment by clear and convincing evidence.132 
Some courts hold that this same standard of proof applies in 
criminal commitment cases,133 while other courts require the 
government to prove the need for criminal commitment beyond a 
reasonable doubt.134 Similarly, many courts find that greater due 
process protections apply in criminal contempt cases than those that 
apply in civil contempt cases.135 
Such differential treatment can also be seen in connection with 
the one Supreme Court case applying the Eldridge three-factor test to 
a criminal defendant. In Ake v. Oklahoma,136 Glen Ake, an indigent 
defendant, was charged with murdering a couple and injuring their 
children.137 The trial court initially declared Ake incompetent to stand 
trial but changed its decision after he received an antipsychotic 
drug.138 Defense counsel then indicated that Ake would raise an 
insanity defense and claimed that the Constitution required the State 
to arrange for a psychiatrist to examine Ake or provide funds so that 
the defense could arrange its own examination.139 The court 
disagreed, no examination was done, and Ake was ultimately 
convicted and sentenced to die.140 
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied Eldridge’s three-factor 
test to determine whether the State has to provide an indigent 
defendant with access to psychiatric assistance.141 The Court quickly 
concluded under factor one that “[t]he private interest in the accuracy 
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of a criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at 
risk is almost uniquely compelling.”142 
Under factor three, the Court turned aside the State’s claim that 
providing psychiatric assistance would be financially burdensome, 
noting that several states and the federal government already do so 
without issue.143 The Court then found that “it is difficult to identify 
any interest of the State, other than that in its economy, that weighs 
against recognition of this right.”144 This is because “[t]he State’s 
interest in prevailing at trial—unlike that of a private litigant—is 
necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate 
adjudication of criminal cases.”145 Moreover, “also unlike a private 
litigant, a State may not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance 
of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that 
advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained.”146 
Finally, with regard to factor two, the Court began by noting “the 
pivotal role that psychiatry has come to play in criminal 
proceedings.”147 The Court then found that the assistance of a 
psychiatrist may be crucial for the jury to be able “to make a sensible 
and educated determination about the mental condition of the 
defendant at the time of the offense.”148 Therefore, the Court 
concluded that an indigent defendant has a due process right of access 
to the services of a competent psychiatrist if he can make a threshold 
showing that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his 
defense.149 Notably, courts have not extended this right to civil 
cases.150 For example, in Goetz v. Crosson,151 the Second Circuit 
declined to extend this right to civil cases because “a civil 
commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to a criminal 
prosecution.”152 
All of these cases support the following conclusions: (1) the Due 
Process Clause gives criminal defendants greater or equal rights than 
those given to civil litigants, and (2) courts use the Eldridge factors to 
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determine when the due process protections in criminal cases need to 
be imported in whole or in part to civil and quasi-criminal cases. It 
logically follows from these two conclusions that the Due Process 
Clause can and should be used, at a minimum, to import each of the 
protections of civil contract law into the criminal plea-bargaining 
process. Again, in the abstract, this proposal should not be too 
controversial, given that courts across the country have found that 
plea agreements are governed or strongly influenced by contract law, 
with defendants also afforded the additional protection of the Due 
Process Clause.153 
When it gets to specifics, however, it appears that there are at 
least three significant aspects of the plea-bargaining process where 
most courts treat pleading criminal defendants worse than their civil 
counterparts. The final part of this Article explains how importation 
of a contract law doctrine into the plea-bargaining process would 
level the playing field and afford pleading defendants additional due 
process protections. 
III.  PLEA AGREEMENTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTS AND THE 
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
In his dissenting opinion in Ricketts v. Adamson, Justice Brennan 
proposed the idea of plea agreements as constitutional contracts and 
lamented the fact that the Supreme Court had “yet to address in any 
comprehensive way the rules of construction appropriate for disputes 
involving plea agreements.”154 Under this Article’s theory of plea 
agreements as constitutional contracts, the Due Process Clause 
requires that pleading defendants be treated at least as well as parties 
to other contracts, and specifically government contracts. At a 
minimum, this means that every contract defense and rule of 
construction that applies in the civil contract law context should apply 
to the extent that it would assist pleading criminal defendants. The 
remainder of this Article assesses one rule of construction—the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing—and explains how 
applying it in the plea-bargaining process would cause significant 
changes to the way that courts treat (1) substantial assistance motions, 
(2) Brady disclosures, and (3) prosecutorial presentation of 
sentencing recommendations. 
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A. Origin of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The 1905 opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York in 
Industrial & General Trust v. Tod155 contains the first significant 
mention of an implied contractual duty of good faith in American 
law.156 In Tod, New York’s highest court concluded that 
[n]o one can be made by contract the final judge of his own 
acts, for the law writes “good faith” into such agreements. No 
covenant of immunity can be drawn that will protect a person 
who acts in bad faith, because such a stipulation is against 
public policy, and the courts will not enforce it. The law 
requires the exercise of good faith, and, no matter how strong 
the provision to shield from liability may be, there is no 
protection unless good faith is observed.157 
Twenty-eight years later, the New York Court of Appeals fully 
fleshed out this analysis, creating what is now known as the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul 
Armstrong Co.,158 playwright Paul Armstrong wrote Alias Jimmy 
Valentine, a dramatization of O. Henry’s novel, A Retrieved 
Reformation.159 Then, in 1921, the Paul Armstrong Company entered 
into a theatrical licensing agreement with the Kirke La Shelle 
Company (“La Shelle”), pursuant to which the latter company would 
receive one-half of the money taken in from theatrical productions of 
the play.160 Subsequently, in 1928, the Paul Armstrong Company sold 
the motion picture rights to Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Corporation and 
refused to pay La Shelle royalties connected to the sale.161 As a result, 
La Shelle brought a breach of contract action, claiming that “the 
contract with Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Corporation was a contract that 
would affect the production of the play.”162 
An intermediate appellate court denied La Shelle relief, finding 
that motion pictures were an unknown quantity at the time of 
contract formation, meaning that the court could not extend the 
contract to cover royalties connected to this new medium.163 The 
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state’s highest court, however, disagreed, concluding that, by entering 
into a contract, the parties assumed a fiduciary relationship that 
created a duty to act with the utmost good faith.164 Specifically, the 
court found that  
in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party 
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or 
injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the 
contract, which means that in every contract there exists an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.165 
Applying this implied covenant to the case at hand, the court 
determined that “there was an implied obligation on the part of the 
[Paul Armstrong Company] not to render valueless the right 
conferred by the contract.”166 Therefore, even though the defendant 
did not violate an express contractual term, it violated the duty 
created by the implied covenant and breached the contract.167 
B. The Modern Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Currently, section 1-304 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“U.C.C.”), which governs many commercial contracts, states that 
“[e]very contract or duty within [the U.C.C.] imposes an obligation of 
good faith in its performance and enforcement.”168 Courts across the 
country have found that this section is a codification of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.169 
Similarly, section 205 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, 
which applies to non-U.C.C. contracts, provides that “[e]very contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement.”170 The Supreme Court recently 
cited this language in its 2010 opinion in Alabama v. North 
Carolina.171 Almost all states imply a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing into every contract.172 
 
 164. Id. at 166 (citing Underhill v. Schenck, 143 N.E. 773, 778 (N.Y. 1924)). 
 165. Id. at 167. 
 166. Id. at 168. 
 167. Id. 
 168. U.C.C. §	1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 169. See, e.g., McNally Wellman Co. v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 
1198 n.9 (2d Cir. 1995); Donovan v. RRL Corp., 27 P.3d 702, 718 (Cal. 2001). 
 170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §	205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 171. 560 U.S. 330, 351 (2010). 
 172. See, e.g., Wright v. Martek Power, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1067 (D. Colo. 2004). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 31 (2018) 
52 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
C. The Implied Covenant and Government Contracts 
Both the Court of Federal Claims, which hears disputes over 
government contracts, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, which reviews those decisions on appeal, have found 
that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to all 
government contracts.173 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
clarified the scope of this covenant in two recent opinions. 
First, in Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States,174 a timber 
buyer sued the government, claiming that its suspension of fourteen 
timber sales contracts violated the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.175 In rejecting this claim in 2010, the Federal Circuit 
found no breach of the implied covenant because (1) the implied 
covenant “cannot expand a party’s contractual duties beyond those in 
the express contract or create duties inconsistent with the contract’s 
provisions”; and (2) “one ‘benefit’ the parties did not contemplate, 
and which Precision Pine is thus not entitled to under the contracts, is 
the guarantee of uninterrupted performance.”176 
Second, in 2011, the Court of Federal Claims applied a similar 
analysis in Metcalf Construction Co. v. United States177 to find that the 
government had not violated the implied covenant by telling a 
construction contractor during its request for proposals that the soil at 
a job site had “slight expansion potential” and then stating after the 
contract took effect (and after additional testing) that the expansion 
potential was “moderate to high.”178 However, the Federal Circuit 
reversed in its 2014 opinion in the case, in the process clarifying the 
scope of the implied covenant.179 
According to the Federal Circuit, the implied covenant “imposes 
obligations on both contracting parties that include the duty not to 
interfere with the other party’s performance and not to act so as to 
destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party regarding the 
fruits of the contract.”180 Therefore, the terms of a contract help to 
define the scope of the covenant because they establish the 
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reasonable expectations of the parties.181 But the Federal Circuit 
rejected the contention that the implied covenant cannot impose 
duties beyond those contained in express contract provisions; instead, 
“a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not 
require a violation of an express provision in the contract.”182 
In reaching this conclusion, the court refused to read Precision 
Pine broadly and instead reaffirmed its prior opinion in Bradley v. 
Chiron Corp.183 The Metcalf court emphasized that in Bradley, the 
Federal Circuit cited a California case holding that “the covenant is 
implied as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to 
prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while 
not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the 
other party’s rights to the benefits of the contract.”184 Therefore, the 
implied covenant allows a government contractor to claim that the 
government violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the contract.185 
Because plea agreements are, in effect, government contracts, 
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the implied covenant is the best 
analog for construing the covenant in the plea-bargaining process. 
This analogy makes even more sense given that parties to traditional 
contracts receive only the protections of contract law,186 while both 
pleading defendants and government contractors have rights against 
the government secured by the Due Process Clause.187 
D. The Implied Covenant and Plea Agreements 
Given that the Supreme Court has held that plea agreements are 
essentially contracts,188 it is unsurprising that the First,189 Second,190 
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Third,191 Fourth,192 Sixth,193 Seventh,194 Eighth,195 Ninth,196 Tenth,197 
and D.C.198 Circuits have partially incorporated the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing into plea agreements, as have state 
supreme courts across the country.199 Many of these opinions, 
however, indicate that a prosecutor can breach the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing even without violating any express 
terms of a plea agreement.200 
For example, in State v. Morrison,201 in exchange for Ashley 
Morrison’s guilty plea to a sex crime and acceptance of responsibility, 
the State agreed not to object to Morrison’s request for a suspended 
sentence.202 Thereafter, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor told 
the judge that the version of events given by Morrison in his 
acceptance of responsibility statement was “disappoint[ing]” and a 
“fairy tale” in which Morrison “didn’t accept any responsibility.”203 
That said, the prosecutor told the judge that he was not backing out 
of the plea deal, but he made sure to tell the judge he was under no 
obligation to adopt the recommendation in the plea agreement.204 
Ultimately, the judge sentenced Morrison to ten years’ incarceration, 
with five years suspended.205 In finding that the prosecutor breached 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Supreme 
Court of South Dakota concluded that “[w]hile the agreement was 
not explicitly reneged, the State impliedly argued for a tougher 
sentence by voicing its discomfort with a suspended imposition.”206 In 
such cases, courts are thus applying the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in the same way that they apply it in the civil 
context. 
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E. Applying the Implied Covenant to Three Key Plea-Bargaining 
Situations 
Facially, then, it appears as if most courts apply the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the plea-bargaining process 
in a way that treats criminal defendants at least as well as parties to 
other contracts, and specifically government contracts. That said, 
there are three key plea-bargaining situations where most courts have 
not extended the implied covenant to plea bargaining and have failed 
to protect pleading defendants. This section identifies these three 
situations and explains how courts can and should apply the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of the implied covenant to produce different 
results. 
1.  Discretionary Government Decisions 
In both government contracts and plea agreements, the 
government sometimes reserves sole discretion to determine whether 
the other party has performed in a way that allows for additional 
benefits. Currently, however, most courts review governmental 
exercises of that discretion very differently in these two contexts. 
a. Substantial Assistance Motions 
Prosecutors often convince defendants to plead guilty based 
upon the promise to file motions known as substantial assistance 
motions. Issues often arise when defendants provide some level of 
assistance that prosecutors deem insufficient to trigger their 
obligation to file such motions. 
i.  United States Sentencing Guidelines and Sentencing Ranges 
When a federal judge is sentencing a criminal defendant, she 
must consult the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the 
“Guidelines”).207 After a federal defendant is convicted, the judge 
uses the Guidelines to calculate an offense level score and a criminal 
history score;208 the judge then plugs those scores into the Guidelines’ 
Sentencing Table to create a sentencing range.209 As an example, the 
Sentencing Table would prescribe a sentencing range of 235 to 293 
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months’ incarceration for a defendant with an offense level score of 
35 and a criminal history score of 8.210 For a defendant with the same 
criminal history score but an offense level of 30—five levels lower—
the Table would prescribe a range of 135 to 168 months’ 
incarceration.211 
In 2005, 18 U.S.C. §	3553(b) provided that federal judges “‘shall 
impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range’ established by 
the Guidelines, subject to departures in specific, limited cases.”212 In 
its 2005 opinion in United States v. Booker,213 the Supreme Court 
deemed this mandatory Guidelines system unconstitutional and 
rendered the Guidelines system, and the sentencing range, advisory.214 
Even after Booker, though, federal judges are still required to consult 
the applicable sentencing range in imposing sentences.215 Moreover, 
when appellate court judges review federal sentences, they consider 
the applicable sentencing range as one of seven factors under 18 
U.S.C. §	3553(a).216 Finally, an appellate court is entitled to apply a 
presumption of reasonableness to a federal sentence that falls within 
the applicable sentencing range.217 
ii.  Substantial Assistance Motions for Downward Departures 
Given the continuing relevance of the Guidelines’ sentencing 
range, motions for downward departures from that range still have 
primary importance. According to the Guidelines, a downward 
departure is a departure that leads to a judge imposing “a sentence 
less than a sentence that could be imposed under the applicable 
guideline range or a sentence that is otherwise less than the guideline 
sentence.”218 A prosecutor can move for a downward departure under 
several sections of the Guidelines, including the most frequently used 
departure: a substantial assistance departure under section 5K1.1 of 
the Guidelines based on assistance given before sentencing.219 Section 
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5K1.1 states in relevant part that “[u]pon motion of the government 
stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an 
offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.”220 
Prosecutors frequently use section 5K1.1 in making plea 
agreements with defendants;221 indeed, the section was created to 
increase cooperation with law enforcement “and, as a necessary 
corollary, to maximize the number of times the section would be 
invoked.”222 
After Booker, federal judges must follow a three-step process 
when a prosecutor files a substantial assistance motion for a 
downward departure under section 5K1.1: (1) continue to calculate 
the applicable Guidelines range, (2) formally rule on the motion for a 
downward departure and state whether they are granting the 
departure and how that departure effects the Guidelines calculation, 
and (3) determine whether the reasonableness factors under §	3553(a) 
justify a modification of the sentence that resulted from applying 
steps one and two.223 
United States v. Ireland224 provides an illustration of this three-
step process. In Ireland, Ian Ireland was charged with various crimes 
connected to a conspiracy to sell drugs and launder money.225 
Subsequently, he entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he 
would plead guilty to some of the charges and provide information 
regarding his co-conspirators in anticipation of the prosecutor filing a 
section 5K1.1 motion.226 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution 
did indeed make a substantial assistance motion for a five-level 
downward departure under section 5K1.1.227 
Under step one, the court determined Ireland’s sentencing range 
under the Guidelines to be 235 to 293 months’ incarceration.228 Under 
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step two, the court granted the State’s motion for a five-level 
downward departure, which led to a sentencing range of 135 to 168 
months.229 Finally, under step three, after considering the §	3553(a) 
factors, the court imposed a sentence of 108 months, which fell below 
the Guidelines.230 
iii.  Prosecutorial Discretion over Substantial Assistance Motions 
Only the prosecution, and not the defense, can file a substantial 
assistance motion for a downward departure under section 5K1.1.231 
Moreover, in the absence of a plea agreement to the contrary, the 
prosecution has the power, not the duty, to file such a motion and 
cannot be compelled by the court to file such a motion.232 
Typically, there are two ways that prosecutors handle section 
5K1.1 motions. First, in a minority of cases, the prosecution will make 
an “unambiguous, unconditional promise to file a downward 
departure motion.”233 Such a promise binds the prosecution, meaning 
that the failure to file such a motion is a breach entitling the 
defendant to relief.234 Second, “[n]ormally, the government retains the 
discretion to determine whether a defendant’s assistance is 
‘substantial’ enough to warrant a §	5K1.1 motion.”235 Similarly, the 
government typically retains discretion over whether to file a motion 
for sentence reduction under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
35(b), which covers substantial assistance given by defendants after 
sentencing.236 
For instance, in United States v. Aderholt,237 the prosecution and 
defense signed a plea agreement that stated in relevant part: 
The United States reserves its option to seek any departure 
from the applicable sentencing guidelines, pursuant to United 
States Sentencing Guidelines §	5K1.1, or Rule 35(b) of the 
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Federal Rules Criminal Procedure, if in the sole discretion of 
the United States, it is determined that such a departure is 
appropriate.238 
iv.  Failure to File and Prosecutorial Breach 
Defendants often claim that prosecutors breach plea agreements 
by failing to file substantial assistance motions, leading to courts 
having to resolve the claim. In a typical case in which a pleading 
defendant claims prosecutorial breach, (1) the prosecution and 
defense sign a plea agreement in which the prosecutor makes the 
conditional promise to file a section 5K1.1 motion if the defendant 
provides substantial assistance, (2) the defendant provides some level 
of assistance to the government, (3) the prosecutor unilaterally 
decides that this assistance does not qualify as substantial assistance, 
(4) the prosecutor refuses to file a section 5K1.1 motion, and (5) the 
defendant claims that the prosecution breached the plea agreement.239 
In its 1992 opinion in Wade v. United States,240 the Supreme 
Court addressed a different but related claim. As the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals explained in United States v. Wade,241 shortly after 
he was arrested, “and without the benefit of a plea agreement, Wade 
began a course of cooperation which provided valuable assistance to 
the government in other prosecutions, leading to the conviction of co-
conspirators.”242 After Wade pleaded guilty and the prosecution did 
not file a section 5K1.1 motion, he appealed, claiming that the court 
should inquire into the government’s motives for not filing a 
motion.243 
In response, the Supreme Court concluded that district courts 
have the authority to review the prosecution’s failure to file a 
substantial assistance motion and grant relief if the defendant makes 
a colorable claim that the failure was because of an unconstitutional 
motive like discrimination based upon the defendant’s race or 
religion.244 The Court, however, noted that Wade had not made such 
a claim and denied him relief.245 
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Since Wade, a circuit split has developed over how courts should 
handle a prosecutor’s refusal to file a section 5K1.1 motion after 
conditionally promising to file one in a plea agreement. A majority of 
federal circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that 
they cannot review the failure to file such a motion for bad faith.246 
According to these courts, a prosecutor’s failure to file is only 
reviewable if the defendant has claimed racial, religious, or other 
invidious discrimination.247 
For instance, in United States v. Garcia-Bonilla,248 Jose Garcia-
Bonilla was charged with several drug-related offenses.249 The two 
sides thereafter entered into a plea agreement that contained a clause 
in which the prosecution conditionally promised to make a section 
5K1.1 or Rule 35(b) motion “if in its discretion, it is determined that 
such a departure is appropriate.”250 Garcia-Bonilla then provided 
information to the government before sentencing, but the prosecutor 
ultimately refused to file a section 5K1.1 motion, claiming that this 
information “turned up basically nothing but dead ends.”251 
This claim led the district court judge to comment, “Every time I 
take a plea with the U.S. Attorney’s office, there is lots of discussion 
about 5K1.1 at time of taking of the plea and then once in a while a 
Section 5K1.1 motion is, in fact, filed, but much more often than not, 
there isn’t.”252 According to the defense, the judge’s reaction invited 
appellate review of the prosecution’s possible bad faith in failing to 
file a section 5K1.1 motion.253 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding 
that the plea agreement did not obligate the prosecution to file a 
substantial assistance motion.254 Instead, Garcia-Bonilla could only be 
entitled to relief if he could establish that the failure to file was based 
upon an “unconstitutional motive.”255 Because Garcia-Bonilla made 
no such allegation, the Fifth Circuit denied him relief.256 
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Some courts have expressed frustration with this approach taken 
by the majority of circuits. In United States v. Hawkins,257 Antwand 
Hawkins pleaded guilty to two bank robberies in connection with a 
plea agreement that stated that “determination of whether 
defendant’s conduct rises to the level of ‘substantial assistance’ will lie 
with the United States in its sole discretion.”258 At the time this plea 
agreement was executed, it was anticipated that Hawkins would be 
the sole witness against one of his accomplices, David Davis, because 
another accomplice, Jordell Steen, was deemed incompetent to stand 
trial and another witness, Mahogany Austin, could not be located.259 
Ultimately, however, Steen was deemed competent and Austin was 
located; both eventually testified against Davis.260 Hawkins, however, 
testified as well, and “the AUSA relied heavily on Hawkins’s 
testimony to support the government’s case against Davis.”261 
Nonetheless, the prosecution refused to file a substantial assistance 
motion.262 
Before both the district court and the Sixth Circuit during oral 
arguments, the prosecution admitted “that Hawkins did absolutely 
everything required of him under the plea agreement.”263 A three-
judge panel of the Sixth Circuit thus determined that Hawkins had 
shown not simply that he supplied substantial assistance but also “that 
the government’s reasons for not filing a downward departure motion 
were not rationally related to any legitimate government end.”264 The 
panel, however, recognized that prior Sixth Circuit precedent only 
allowed for review of a failure to file based upon an allegation of an 
unconstitutional motive.265 Therefore, the panel denied Hawkins 
relief but (unsuccessfully) “urge[d] en banc review of this case” so 
that the Sixth Circuit could circumscribe its reading of Wade.266 
A minority of federal circuits have already limited the 
application of Wade to allow courts to review claims that prosecutors 
breach plea bargains by failing to file in bad faith.267 For example, in 
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United States v. Isaac,268 Rupert Isaac entered into a plea agreement 
on drug and weapons charges; the agreement contained a clause 
stating that the government would file a 5K1.1 motion “if the 
government, in its sole discretion, determines that the defendant has 
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense.”269 
Thereafter, Isaac met with law enforcement on a few occasions 
and provided them information about criminal activity of others, but 
the prosecution refused to file a section 5K1.1 motion, claiming that it 
had been unable to verify or independently corroborate the 
information.270 Isaac thus moved for an order directing the 
prosecution to file a section 5K1.1 motion but acknowledged that he 
was not alleging the government’s failure to file was based upon 
constitutionally suspect grounds.271 As a result, the district court 
denied him relief.272 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. The court acknowledged 
the existence of Wade and cited it for the proposition that “where the 
defendant has not entered a plea agreement, it is clear that the 
prosecutor has almost unreviewable discretion over whether to file a 
substantial assistance motion.”273 Isaac, however, had entered into a 
plea agreement, and the Third Circuit concluded that “it is equally 
clear that when a defendant has entered into a plea agreement 
expressly requiring the government to make a §	5K1.1 motion, a 
district court has broad powers to enforce the terms of the plea 
contract.”274 
The Third Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Santobello v. New York and its holding that plea agreements are 
contractual in nature, meaning that courts apply contract law 
principles to determine whether they have been satisfied.275 The court 
then applied the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
finding that Isaac had a reasonable expectation that the prosecution 
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would evaluate his cooperation in good faith.276 Therefore, the Third 
Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
the government acted in bad faith.277 
Case law from across the country, including the Federal Circuit, 
suggests that the Third Circuit acted correctly. It is well established by 
courts nationwide that when a contract gives one party the power to 
make discretionary decisions without defined standards, that party 
must act in accordance with the other party’s reasonable expectations 
and not in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.278 
In its 2007 opinion in North Star Alaska Housing Corp. v. United 
States,279 the Court of Federal Claims dealt with a situation that was 
strikingly similar to the situations in Garcia-Bonilla, Hawkins, and 
Isaac. In North Star, the plaintiff won a government contract and 
lease to build a 400-unit housing project for soldiers and their families 
at Fort Wainwright, Alaska.280 According to the lease, “the Army, ‘at 
its option’ may pay North Star an ‘incentive fee’ of up to five percent 
of the maintenance rent for the period of time for which North Star’s 
performance is found by the Army to ‘substantially exceed the 
established standards’ of the Lease.”281 
When the Army did not pay this incentive fee, the plaintiff 
brought a breach of contract action.282 The Army responded that the 
lease contained no obligation for it to award the incentive fee, 
meaning that its decision not to reward one was unreviewable.283 The 
Court of Federal Claims disagreed, citing to prior precedent holding 
“that a range of seemingly unilateral contracting decisions may be set 
aside if agency officials considered factors that were not relevant, 
followed improper procedures, or otherwise acted arbitrarily.”284 
Specifically, the court noted that, even when the government is given 
absolute discretion, it must comply with the implied covenant of good 
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faith and fair dealing.285 Ultimately, the court concluded that the 
Army breached the implied covenant,286 and it has made similar 
conclusions in other cases.287 
v.  Applying the Implied Covenant to Substantial Assistance Motions 
Given that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
applies to the government’s discretionary decisions in government 
contracts,288 there is a good argument under this Article’s thesis that 
the implied covenant should automatically apply to government 
discretionary decisions in plea agreements, such as the decision to not 
file a substantial assistance motion. In the absence of such an 
automatic application, courts would need to consult the three 
Eldridge factors: (1) the petitioner’s private interest, (2) the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of this interest through the current 
procedure(s) and the probable value of additional safeguards, and (3) 
the government’s countervailing interest.289 
The most relevant analog for this analysis is Ake v. Oklahoma, in 
which the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant has a due 
process right of access to the services of a competent psychiatrist if he 
can make a threshold showing that his sanity is likely to be a factor in 
his defense.290 Under the first factor—the private interest involved—
the Court recognized that “[t]he private interest in the accuracy of a 
criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at risk is 
almost uniquely compelling.”291 This interest is directly implicated 
when a defendant (1) decides to sign a plea agreement based upon a 
prosecutor’s conditional promise to file a substantial assistance 
motion, and (2) later claims that the prosecutor acted in bad faith by 
failing to file such a motion. 
The Ake Court found under the third factor—the government’s 
countervailing interest—that any interest the prosecution has in 
prevailing must be tempered by the interest in a fair and accurate 
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adjudication of criminal cases.292 In Santobello, the Court concluded 
that these same considerations apply to the plea-bargaining process.293 
Moreover, the Court in Ake refuted the State’s claim that granting 
indigent defendants the right to psychiatric assistance would be 
unduly burdensome by noting that several jurisdictions already 
recognize the right without incident.294 As noted, a minority of 
jurisdictions already apply the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing to allow courts to review refusals to file substantial assistance 
motions for bad faith.295 Therefore, there is not a good argument that 
bad faith hearings would be unduly burdensome. As the Third Circuit 
noted in Isaac, “[t]he sole requirement is that the government’s 
position be based on an honest evaluation of the assistance provided 
and not on considerations extraneous to that assistance.”296 
Finally, under the second factor—the risk of erroneous 
deprivation and the probative value of additional safeguards—the 
Ake Court noted “the pivotal role that psychiatry has come to play in 
criminal proceedings” and the importance of psychiatric assistance in 
ensuring that the jury can make a sensible and educated 
determination about the defendant’s mental state.297 While this is 
true, only about one percent of felony defendants raise the insanity 
defense.298 Conversely, about ninety-five percent of criminal cases are 
resolved by plea agreements, and the most popular downward 
departure motion included in such agreements is the substantial 
assistance motion.299 Moreover, just as jurors are not able to resolve 
insanity pleas without psychiatrist participation, courts are unable to 
determine whether prosecutors breached plea agreements if they are 
only allowed to review refusals to file substantial assistance motions 
for unconstitutional motives. 
Finally, after balancing all three Eldridge factors, the Ake Court 
concluded that an indigent defendant is only entitled to psychiatric 
assistance if he can make the threshold showing that his sanity is 
likely to be a factor in his defense.300 A similar limitation can, and has 
been, applied in the substantial assistance motion context. In Isaac, 
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the Third Circuit held that Isaac was entitled to a hearing on whether 
the government acted in good faith in failing to file a substantial 
assistance motion only if he made a threshold showing of bad faith.301 
Only one federal circuit court has applied the Eldridge test to 
review refusals to file substantial assistance motions. In United States 
v. Valencia,302 Sergio Aguera was convicted of conspiring to possess 
cocaine with intent to distribute after a jury trial.303 Subsequent to 
sentencing, Aguera appealed, claiming that the prosecution failed to 
file a section 5K1.1 motion despite the fact that he provided the 
government substantial assistance.304 
In response, the Seventh Circuit cited Eldridge but concluded 
that it did not help Aguera because he presupposed a nonexistent 
right to have the court consider his assistance in sentencing.305 Later, 
the Seventh Circuit applied this same reasoning in United States v. 
Donatiu,306 where the defendant did not reach a plea agreement but 
still ended up pleading guilty.307 
These conclusions are, of course, correct, as was the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in Wade: a defendant has no freestanding right to 
have (1) a prosecutor file a substantial assistance motion, or (2) the 
judge consider his assistance in sentencing.308 But if the prosecution 
conditionally promises in a plea agreement to file such a motion, the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should require that 
the prosecutor’s decision not be made in bad faith. This would place 
pleading defendants on a level playing field with parties to 
government contracts, and it would not require overruling Wade. 
Courts would simply need to find that Wade is inapplicable when a 
plea agreement is in place. 
2.  The Duty to Disclose Material Evidence 
Before entering into a government contract or plea agreement, a 
company or citizen has an interest in the government disclosing 
material information that has bearing upon the deal. Currently, 
however, courts place significantly different obligations upon the 
government in these two situations. 
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a. Brady v. Maryland and Plea Agreements 
In Brady v. Maryland,309 the Supreme Court concluded that the 
Due Process Clause places an affirmative obligation on the State to 
timely disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense.310 The 
Court later clarified that evidence is material when there is a 
reasonable probability that its disclosure would have led to a different 
result, i.e., an acquittal or lesser sentence.311 The American Bar 
Association later followed up on Brady by adopting Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.8(d), which currently states that a prosecutor 
must “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or 
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused or mitigates the offense.”312 
There can be a Brady violation based upon the government 
failing to disclose material substantive evidence, such as a confession 
by a government’s witness that he, and not the defendant, committed 
the crime at issue.313 Moreover, in Giglio v. United States,314 the 
Supreme Court concluded that Brady covers material impeachment 
evidence that calls into question the credibility of a key witness for 
the prosecution.315 For instance, in Giglio, the prosecution violated 
Brady by failing to disclose that the defendant’s alleged co-
conspirator and chief witness for the prosecution was testifying 
pursuant to a promise that he would not be prosecuted if he testified 
against the defendant.316 
In its subsequent 2002 opinion in United States v. Ruiz,317 the 
Supreme Court partially determined the relationship between Brady 
and plea bargaining. In Ruiz, immigration agents found thirty 
kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz’s luggage.318 Federal 
prosecutors thereafter offered Ruiz a “fast track” plea bargain, 
pursuant to which the government would recommend a two-level 
downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines in exchange 
for Ruiz waiving indictment, trial, and appeal.319 The plea deal also 
required Ruiz to “‘waiv[e] the right’ to receive ‘impeachment 
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information relating to any informants or other witnesses’ as well as 
the right to receive information supporting any affirmative defense 
the defendant raises if the case goes to trial.”320 Because Ruiz would 
not agree to this last requirement, she rejected the plea deal but later 
ended up pleading guilty to unlawful drug possession, without any 
plea agreement.321 
At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same two-
level downward departure that she would have received under the 
plea deal, but the judge instead imposed the standard Guidelines 
sentence.322 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the disputed 
provision was a Brady waiver and that the right to Brady material 
cannot be waived without offending the due process requirement that 
defendants enter plea agreements voluntarily and intelligently.323 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and more generally 
found that there is no Brady right to material impeachment evidence 
before pleading guilty for three reasons.324 First, the Court concluded 
that “impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of 
a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary.”325 Second, the 
Court found that a defendant can voluntarily plead guilty and thus 
waive several constitutional rights “despite various forms of 
misapprehension under which a defendant might labor,” such as his 
attorney misjudging the admissibility of a confession or failing to 
point out a potential defense.326 Third, the Court applied the Eldridge 
factors. Under the first factor—the private interest involved—the 
Ruiz Court implicitly acknowledged a criminal defendant’s 
compelling interest in obtaining material impeachment evidence.327  
With regard to the second Eldridge factor—the risk of erroneous 
deprivation and the probative value of additional safeguards—the 
Court made two conclusions. First, the proposed plea deal contained 
a clause obligating the prosecution to provide “‘any information 
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant’ regardless.”328 
According to the Court, “[t]hat fact,” plus the safeguards of Rule 11, 
“diminishes the force of Ruiz’s concern that, in the absence of 
impeachment information, innocent individuals, accused of crimes, 
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will plead guilty.”329 Second, the Court concluded that the added 
value of a right to material impeachment evidence would often be 
“limited, for it depends upon the defendant’s independent awareness 
of the details of the Government’s case.”330 
Finally, regarding the third factor—the government’s 
countervailing interest—the Court found that requiring pre-plea 
disclosure of material impeachment evidence could (1) disrupt 
ongoing investigations by risking premature disclosure of government 
witness information, (2) force the government to devote more 
resources to cases prior to plea bargaining, and/or (3) cause the 
government to cease its heavy reliance on plea bargaining.331 
As a result of Ruiz, defendants across the country do not have a 
Brady right to material impeachment evidence prior to plea 
bargaining.332 On the other hand, the Ruiz Court did not resolve the 
issue of whether defendants have a Brady right to material substantive 
evidence prior to plea bargaining.333 In the absence of Supreme Court 
guidance, a circuit split has developed over the issue.334 
The Fifth Circuit is one of the courts that has extended Ruiz to 
substantive evidence. In United States v. Conroy,335 Pamelia Conroy 
pleaded guilty to fraud charges based upon, inter alia, statements she 
made to Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) about 
her house in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.336 After pleading guilty, 
Conroy learned about a previously undisclosed FBI interview of her 
friend Sandra Pierce.337 According to the FBI report on the interview, 
Pierce was present for Conroy’s call to the FEMA representative, 
everything Conroy told the representative was accurate, and Conroy 
left the conversation believing she qualified for FEMA funding.338 
In finding that there was no Brady violation, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected Conroy’s argument that Ruiz only applies to impeachment 
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evidence and not substantive evidence.339 According to the court, 
“Ruiz never makes such a distinction nor can this proposition be 
implied from its discussion.”340 
In United States v. Ohiri,341 the Tenth Circuit took the opposite 
approach.342 In Ohiri, the prosecution charged Emmanuel Ohiri and 
John Thomas Morris with conspiracy to transport, store, and dispose 
of hazardous waste in violation of the Resources and Conservation 
Recovery Act.343 Before Morris pleaded guilty, he completed an 
Acceptance of Responsibility statement, in which he claimed that 
“Manny Ohiri was not informed of my waste management strategy 
and techniques in this particular case.”344 
Because the prosecution did not disclose this statement before 
Ohiri’s guilty plea, he later appealed, claiming a Brady violation.345 In 
finding that this claim was potentially viable, the Tenth Circuit 
determined that the Supreme Court’s conclusion with regard to 
impeachment evidence in Ruiz “did not imply that the government 
may avoid the consequence of a Brady violation if the defendant 
accepts an eleventh-hour plea agreement while ignorant of withheld 
exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession.”346 
State courts have similarly split over the issue. For example, in 
Buffey v. Ballard,347 David Ballard pleaded guilty to two counts of 
sexual assault and one count of robbery pursuant to a plea 
agreement.348 After pleading guilty, Ballard learned that DNA testing 
had been done in the case, leading to a report concluding: 
“[A]ssuming there are only two contributors (including [the victim]), 
Joseph Buffey is excluded as the donor of the seminal fluid identified 
[from the rape kit] cuttings.”349 The Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia found that the nondisclosure of this DNA testing was a 
Brady violation, concluding that “Ruiz specifically distinguished 
impeachment evidence from exculpatory evidence.”350 
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Conversely, in Walton v. State,351 the Court of Appeals of 
Mississippi found that no such distinction exists.352 In Walton, four 
assailants wearing masks brutally beat a pizza-delivery employee on 
Halloween night.353 Kenny Walton, Jasmond Matthews, Corderal 
McKnight, and Michael McGee were charged in connection with the 
assault.354 Walton eventually pleaded guilty to the crime without 
being told that both Matthews and McKnight told police that 
Desmond Johnson and Nookie Alexander were the other two men 
involved in the assault.355 In rejecting Walton’s ensuing Brady claim, 
the Court of Appeals of Mississippi concluded that Ruiz did not 
distinguish between impeachment and substantive evidence.356 
In such cases, defendants frequently seek federal habeas relief 
after state courts deny their Brady claims. In order to secure habeas 
relief, however, defendants must show that state courts have violated 
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme 
Court.357 As noted, some circuit courts have found that Ruiz does not 
distinguish between impeachment and substantive evidence; 
therefore, federal district courts in these circuits have denied habeas 
relief to defendants who did not receive material substantive evidence 
before pleading guilty.358 Moreover, both federal circuit courts359 and 
district courts360 in circuits that have yet to address the scope of Ruiz 
have denied habeas relief in such cases due to the circuit split. 
b. The Implied Covenant and the Superior Knowledge Doctrine 
Courts have handled the duty to disclose material evidence very 
differently in the government contract context. In government 
contracts, it is well established that, “[u]nder the implied duty of good 
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faith and fair dealing, the Government maintains an implied duty to 
disclose information fundamental to the preparation of estimates or 
contract performance.”361 Therefore, “where the Government 
possesses special knowledge not shared by the contractor, which is 
vital to the performance of the contract, the Government has an 
affirmative duty to disclose such knowledge. It cannot remain silent 
with impunity.”362 While it is not a fiduciary for its contractors, “the 
Government—where the balance of knowledge is so clearly on its 
side—can no more betray a contractor into a ruinous course of action 
by silence than by the written or spoken word.”363 
According to the Federal Circuit, this “superior knowledge” 
doctrine applies to contracts where 
(1) a contractor undertakes to perform without vital knowledge 
of a fact that affects performance costs or duration; (2) the 
government was aware the contractor had no knowledge of and 
had no reason to obtain such information; (3) any contract 
specification supplied misled the contractor, or did not put it on 
notice to inquire; and (4) the government failed to provide the 
relevant information.364 
This doctrine applied in Miller Elevator Co. v. United States,365 
where the Miller Elevator Company contracted with the General 
Services Administration (“GSA”) to provide elevator maintenance 
services for a federal office building in St. Louis.366 Later, GSA 
authorized substantial renovation to the building, resulting in an 
increase to the amount and extent of work required to maintain the 
elevators in the building.367 Miller responded by claiming that the 
GSA had breached the contract by failing to disclose that it had 
anticipated the letting of a $42 million contract for renovation of the 
building before entering into the contract.368 The Court of Federal 
Claims agreed, finding that Miller had satisfied all four elements of 
the test, meaning that “the Government breached the implied duty of 
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good faith and fair dealing by the nondisclosure of superior 
knowledge.”369 
Similarly, in ASI Constructors, Inc. v. United States,370 the Court 
of Federal Claims denied a motion by the Army Corps of Engineers 
to dismiss a claim that it violated the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by failing to disclose material information regarding 
site conditions to a government contractor performing work on a dam 
in Oklahoma.371 Finally, in Petrochem Services, Inc. v. United States,372 
the Federal Circuit found that the Navy violated the superior 
knowledge doctrine by failing to disclose the amount of oil spilled to a 
government contractor who won a contract to clean an oil spill at the 
Great Lakes, Illinois, Naval Base.373 
c. Applying the Implied Covenant to Brady Evidence 
Under this Article’s theory of plea agreements as constitutional 
contracts, courts should incorporate the superior knowledge doctrine 
into plea agreements and find a Brady violation if (1) a defendant 
undertakes to perform without vital knowledge of a fact that affects 
performance, (2) the government was aware the defendant had no 
knowledge of and had no reason to obtain such information, (3) any 
discovery supplied misled the defendant or did not put him on notice 
to inquire, and (4) the government failed to provide the relevant 
information. All of these factors are already part of the Brady test. To 
prove a Brady violation, a defendant must establish that (1) he lacked 
knowledge of material exculpatory evidence,374 (2) he could not have 
obtained the evidence through reasonable diligence,375 (3) the 
government’s discovery misled the defendant or did not put him on 
notice to inquire,376 and (4) the government failed to disclose the 
material exculpatory evidence to the defendant.377 
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Given that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
requires the government to disclose superior knowledge of material 
facts before a contractor enters into a government contract, there is a 
good argument under this Article’s thesis that the implied covenant 
should automatically require the government to disclose material 
exculpatory evidence to defendants before they enter into plea 
agreements.378 Once again, in the absence of such an automatic 
application, courts would need to consult the three Eldridge factors. 
As noted, the Ruiz Court actually did apply the Eldridge factors 
in finding that a defendant has no Brady right to material 
impeachment evidence before pleading guilty.379 However, it is 
important to note that, as was the case in Wade,380 there was no plea 
agreement in Ruiz.381 Therefore, there is no reason that Ruiz should 
bind lower courts in cases where defendants claim that the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires disclosure of material 
exculpatory evidence before a defendant enters into a plea 
agreement. 
Furthermore, even if Ruiz did apply in this type of case, there are 
reasons to believe it should be repudiated. First, in July 2009, the 
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
issued Formal Opinion 09-454, which provided guidance on the scope 
of the prosecutor’s duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to 
the defense.382 According to Opinion 09-454, the prosecutor has an 
obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence “prior to a guilty 
plea proceeding.”383 While the Standing Committee noted that Rule 
3.8 creates a more expansive disclosure obligation than the 
constitutional duty created by Brady,384 Opinion 09-454 is still 
persuasive authority that calls the Ruiz holding into question. 
Second, as noted, one of the Ruiz Court’s primary justifications 
for not applying Brady to guilty pleas was that a defendant can 
voluntarily plead guilty and thus waive several constitutional rights 
“despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant 
might labor,” such as his attorney misjudging the admissibility of a 
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confession or failing to point out a potential defense.385 This is no 
longer the case after Lafler v. Cooper386 and Missouri v. Frye,387 which 
held that the right to the effective assistance of counsel applies to the 
plea-bargaining process.388 In its aforementioned opinion in Buffey v. 
Ballard, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that 
the Court’s conclusions in Lafler and Frye “suggest that the assertion 
that Brady is a ‘trial right’ will not preclude it from being applied 
during plea bargaining.”389 
There are also reasons to question the Court’s decision in Ruiz 
under the Eldridge factors. Under the first factor—the private interest 
at stake—it is clear that a criminal defendant has a uniquely 
compelling interest in not being deprived of life or liberty without due 
process of law.390 
With regard to the second factor—the risk of erroneous 
deprivation and the probative value of additional safeguards—the 
Ruiz Court first found that the risk of erroneous deprivation was 
mitigated by a clause in the proposed plea agreement obligating the 
prosecution to provide “any information establishing the factual 
innocence of the defendant.”391 This conclusion, however, ignores the 
fact that Brady evidence is, by definition, evidence that creates the 
reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial, principally a 
“not guilty” verdict instead of a “guilty” verdict.392 Under the plea 
clause in Ruiz, a defendant would seemingly be entitled to evidence 
of an alternate suspect’s confession but would not be entitled to 
evidence that the government’s key witness was legally blind, would 
be testifying pursuant to a favorable plea deal, or was out of town on 
the night of the crime. 
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Essentially without explanation, the Ruiz Court’s opinion 
prioritizes evidence that strengthens a defendant’s case for his 
innocence over evidence that weakens the government’s case for 
guilt. Such a forced dichotomy seems at odds with Model Rule 3.8(d), 
which, as noted, obligates the prosecutor to “make timely disclosure 
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused.”393 Also, despite the plea 
clause in Ruiz, it is clear that at least some courts, such as the Court of 
Appeals of Mississippi in Walton v. State, have found that Brady does 
not apply in the plea-bargaining context even when the evidence at 
issue is evidence of innocence.394 
Moreover, the Ruiz Court seemingly lacked support for its 
conclusion that the safeguards of Rule 11 “diminish[] the force of 
Ruiz’s concern that, in the absence of impeachment information, 
innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty.”395 As noted, 
Rule 11 requires a judge to address a defendant personally to ensure 
that his plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.396 It is unclear how 
this safeguard protects a defendant who is pleading guilty because the 
government has withheld evidence of a key weakness in its case. 
The Ruiz Court also argued that the value of the Brady 
safeguard in the plea-bargaining context would often be “limited, for 
it depends upon the defendant’s independent awareness of the details 
of the Government’s case.”397 But it is hard to imagine when this 
would be true for either substantive or impeachment evidence. In the 
case of forensic evidence, such as a DNA test excluding the defendant 
as the source of physical evidence in the case, the probative value of 
the evidence would be immediately apparent. In cases of exculpatory 
statements, such as someone else telling the police, “The defendant 
did not commit the crime,” “Joe Doe committed the crime,” or “I 
committed the crime,” again the probative value would be clear. And, 
in the impeachment context, while a defendant might not know all of 
the contours of the government’s case, he would certainly recognize 
the importance of an eyewitness suffering an infirmity such as legal 
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blindness or an accomplice having a history of crimes of dishonesty or 
an agreement to testify based upon a favorable plea deal. 
Finally, regarding the third factor—the government’s 
countervailing interest—the Ruiz Court began by noting that 
requiring disclosure of material impeachment evidence before guilty 
pleas “risks premature disclosure of Government witness 
information, which .	.	. could ‘disrupt ongoing investigations’ and 
expose prospective witnesses to serious harm.”398 As support for this 
conclusion, the Court cited to the Jencks Act, Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 16, and 18 U.S.C. §	3432, all of which allow for 
“late” disclosure of certain witness information.399 The Ruiz Court, 
however, failed to acknowledge that (1) the early disclosure 
requirements of Brady typically trump the later disclosure 
requirements of these other laws and rules,400 and (2) the government 
can request deferral of early production if it has concerns in a 
particular case.401 It is unclear why the prosecution could not employ 
a similar deferral procedure before plea hearings as it currently 
employs before trials to quell the identified risks. 
Instead of reaching such a resolution, however, the Ruiz Court 
concluded that requiring disclosure of material impeachment 
evidence before guilty pleas could alternately force the government to 
devote more resources to plea bargaining or abandon its heavy 
reliance on plea bargaining.402 Given that several states already 
require disclosure of some Brady material during plea bargaining, the 
Ake opinion would suggest that this fear is misplaced.403 Perhaps more 
importantly, the Ruiz Court’s conclusion is fundamentally at odds 
with the Court’s prior opinion in United States v. Mezzanatto.404 
Typically, Federal Rule of Evidence 410 precludes the 
prosecution from introducing any statements the defendant made 
during plea bargaining at trial.405 But, in Mezzanatto, as a 
precondition to plea bargaining, the prosecution forced the defendant 
to sign a waiver indicating that any statements he made during plea 
discussions could be used to impeach him in the event his case went to 
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trial.406 The defendant later claimed that Rule 410 was not waivable 
and that allowing for waivers could “bring plea bargaining to a 
grinding halt.”407 
In response, the Mezzanatto Court raised some of the same 
concerns that the Ruiz Court would later raise about how plea 
bargaining can complicate ongoing investigations, especially given 
limited governmental resources.408 But this did not lead the Court to 
conclude that Rule 410 should be repealed or that the defendant’s 
countervailing interest should make the Rule nonwaivable. Instead, 
the Court found that “[a] sounder way to encourage settlement is to 
permit the interested parties to enter into knowing and voluntary 
negotiations without any arbitrary limits on their bargaining chips.”409 
As a result, Rule 410 applies to plea bargaining but is waivable. If the 
prosecution has a relatively strong case, the defendant might sign a 
waiver to get to the plea-bargaining table; if the prosecution has a 
relatively weak case, the defendant might refuse to sign a waiver and 
force the prosecution to plea bargain without one. 
The Mezzanatto solution seems equally applicable to the Ruiz 
scenario. Indeed, the Court in Ruiz easily could have found that the 
Brady waiver in the case it was reviewing was valid without reaching 
the sweeping conclusion that Brady doesn’t apply in whole or in part 
to the plea-bargaining process. Both the superior knowledge doctrine 
and Mezzanatto suggest that the Brady doctrine should apply in the 
plea-bargaining context, with the parties able to negotiate a possible 
Brady waiver. 
Applying the Brady doctrine to plea bargaining based on the 
implied covenant would place defendants in the same position as a 
government contractor. They could either negotiate away their right 
to material exculpatory evidence or enter into plea agreements only 
after learning about the existence of such evidence from the party 
with superior knowledge. 
3.  The Affirmative Duty to Cooperate 
A company or citizen who enters into a government contract or 
plea agreement has an interest in the government affirmatively 
cooperating in a manner consistent with the reasonable expectations 
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of the party. Most courts, however, currently place significantly 
different obligations upon the government in these two situations. 
a. Benchimol and the Duty Not to Undermine 
In United States v. Benchimol,410 John Benchimol, a minor, was 
charged with one count of mail fraud after allegedly using false names 
and information to obtain credit cards.411 Benchimol entered into a 
sentencing recommendation agreement, which required the 
government to recommend probation with restitution in exchange for 
Benchimol’s guilty plea.412 The presentence report presented at the 
sentencing hearing, however, incorrectly stated that the government 
would remain silent regarding the proposed sentence.413 As a result, 
when the prosecutor initially said nothing, defense counsel informed 
the judge that the government had in fact agreed to recommend 
probation with restitution.414 In response, the prosecutor spoke his 
only words regarding the government’s recommendation: “That is an 
accurate representation.”415 The judge subsequently sentenced 
Benchimol to six years of treatment and supervision under the Youth 
Corrections Act.416 
Benchimol thereafter moved to withdraw his plea or have his 
sentence vacated, claiming that the government had breached the 
plea agreement.417 The district court denied his motion, but the Ninth 
Circuit found on appeal that the government can breach a plea 
agreement by merely making “[a] perfunctory statement of the 
recommendation,” which “can easily leave the impression that the 
government is unconvinced that the recommendation is appropriate 
or even that it tacitly disfavors the recommendation.”418 Finding that 
the prosecutor made such a perfunctory statement in the case at hand, 
the Ninth Circuit ruled that there was a breach, concluding “that 
when the government undertakes to recommend a sentence pursuant 
to a plea bargain, it has the duty to state its recommendation clearly 
to the sentencing judge and to express the justification for it.”419 
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The Ninth Circuit bolstered its finding by citing two other federal 
circuit court opinions. In the Fifth Circuit case United States v. 
Grandinetti420 the prosecutor said the following to the judge about the 
recommendation in the plea agreement: “I’m not too sure of the 
legality of it nor the propriety, but none the less it is there.”421 
Similarly, in the Fourth Circuit case United States v. Brown422 the 
prosecutor said the following to the judge about the recommendation 
in a plea deal: “Well, Your Honor, I do have some problems with 
that, anyhow, but that is the way I understand it.”423 Both courts 
concluded that these comments breached the respective plea 
agreements.424 
In his dissenting opinion in Benchimol, however, Judge John 
Wallace distinguished Grandinetti and Brown as cases where “the 
prosecutors expressed open distaste for the plea bargains” as opposed 
to lukewarm support.425 According to Judge Wallace, neither the 
Supreme Court Rules nor the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility imposes a duty of zeal on prosecutors in “fulfilling a 
bargain, nor could they” because “[t]he defendant is not the 
prosecutor’s client.”426 
In its 1985 opinion in United States v. Benchimol,427 the Supreme 
Court agreed with Judge Wallace’s dissent in a per curiam opinion.428 
The Court began by noting that the government in a given case might 
agree as part of a plea deal to “enthusiastically” recommend a certain 
sentence or explain the reasons behind its recommendation.429 It then 
found, though, that the parties had struck no such bargain in the 
present case and that the Ninth Circuit had instead implied an 
obligation to enthusiastically recommend a sentence based upon the 
government’s promise to recommend a particular sentence.430 The 
Court then rejected this reasoning, concluding that Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11 “does not suggest .	.	. such implied-in-law 
terms as were read into this agreement by the Court of Appeals.”431 
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Finally, the Court agreed with Judge Wallace’s determination that 
Grandinetti and Brown were inapposite because the prosecutors 
expressed reservations about the plea agreements in those cases 
instead of merely offering tepid support, as was the case in 
Benchimol.432 
Since Benchimol, most courts have agreed with its dichotomy 
and held that a prosecutor may express less than enthusiastic support 
for a plea agreement as long as the prosecutor “does not undermine 
her own promised sentencing recommendation by expressing her 
personal reservations at the sentencing hearing.”433 For instance, in 
United States v. Hand,434 the prosecutor agreed to recommend a two-
level reduction in sentencing level based upon the defendant’s minor 
participation in a drug crime.435 At the sentencing hearing, the 
prosecutor said the following: 
Regarding role in the offense, we again recommend that this 
defendant receive a reduction for having a minor role in the 
offense. That was my assessment at that time. The court’s well 
aware of the facts in this case and can make its own conclusion. 
We’ve agreed to recommend that, however.436 
Hand later appealed, arguing “that the government violated the 
spirit, if not the letter, of the plea agreement.”437 In finding that this 
statement did not breach the plea agreement, the Tenth Circuit cited 
Benchimol to conclude that, “[a]lthough the prosecutor’s simple 
statement that the court could reach its own conclusion was 
unnecessary and probably imprudent under the circumstances, it was 
not tantamount to an argument that the recommendation should be 
disregarded or that the reduction would be improper.”438 
In turn, the Seventh Circuit cited this language from Hand in 
United States v. Jimenez,439 a case in which the prosecutor actually 
made an unconditional promise to file a section 5K1.1 motion for a 
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downward departure.440 The prosecutor completed, but did not file, a 
5K1.1 motion, but he did make a brief oral request for a downward 
departure at the sentencing hearing.441 The judge did not grant a 
downward departure, stating that “[t]he government’s .	.	. apparent 
oral motion for 5(k)1.1 departure is denied. It hasn’t been properly 
substantiated.”442 At this point, the prosecutor filed the 5K1.1 motion, 
prompting the judge to respond “the motion is filed and denied.”443 In 
concluding that the prosecutor had not breached the plea agreement, 
the court found the last-minute filing was “probably imprudent under 
the circumstances” but “did not undermine the recommendation that 
the government made to the court.”444 
Some courts have even found that a prosecutor does not need to 
make any oral recommendation at a sentencing hearing. In United 
States v. Cates,445 Edward Cates agreed to plead guilty to one count of 
wire fraud and four counts of bank robbery in exchange for the 
prosecutor promising to “recommend at sentencing” a ten-year cap 
on any sentence.446 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor did not 
orally make this recommendation and impliedly argued for a “strict, 
yet indeterminate, term of imprisonment” by telling the judge: 
It seems to me that Mr. Cates has in his head, in the words of 
Auden, “I like committing crimes. It seems the system likes 
forgiving them. Really, the world is admirably arranged.” .	.	. 
[P]rotection of the public is probably the only consideration 
that can be served at this stage.447 
The Fifth Circuit found that the prosecutor’s actions did not 
violate the plea agreement. While the prosecutor did not orally make 
the promised recommendation, the court found “that the 
recommended ten-year cap was prominently featured in all three 
documents before the sentencing court”: the plea agreement, the 
sentencing memorandum, and the presentence report.448 Further, with 
regard to the prosecutor’s statement, the court concluded that, “[i]n 
.	.	. light of Benchimol, we cannot hold that the government’s promise 
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in this case .	.	. precluded the prosecutor from arguing for a strict, yet 
indeterminate, term of imprisonment.”449 
Conversely, courts in a handful of states have placed a greater 
obligation on prosecutors. For example, in State v. Wills,450 Daniel 
Wills agreed to plead guilty to two counts of sexual misconduct in 
exchange for the prosecutor dropping a third charge and 
recommending “unified terms of fifteen years, with minimum periods 
of confinement of three years.”451 At sentencing, the prosecutor 
commented that “[w]hat he did to these two little ones is just 
completely horrendous and almost unthinkable. And I think, at a very 
minimum, he should get three years fixed followed by twelve 
indeterminate for fifteen. I think the state is showing great restraint 
by only recommending that sentence.”452 
In deciding that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho noted Benchimol’s holding but found that 
“Wills was entitled to have the prosecutor’s conduct conform to what 
Wills reasonably understood to be the bargain.”453 The court then 
cited Webster’s New International Dictionary, which “defines 
‘recommend’ as ‘to mention or introduce as being worthy of 
acceptance, use, or trial.’”454 According to the court, the prosecutor’s 
comments did not endorse the agreement as one the judge should 
accept and therefore violated that agreement.455 
In its opinion in State v. Foster,456 the Court of Appeals of Kansas 
reached the same result when the prosecutor simply said the 
following at sentencing: “The State did agree to probation in this case 
and that is our recommendation.”457 In making this conclusion, the 
court cited to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and 
found that it supported the conclusion that a prosecutor must take 
special care to fulfill “any term of a plea agreement that has induced 
the defendant to give up constitutionally protected rights and plead to 
a crime.”458 Similarly, in State v. Lopez,459 the Supreme Court of Iowa 
held that “[o]ur precedent makes clear the prosecutor must do more 
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than merely recite the plea recommendation; the prosecutor must 
‘indicate to the court that the recommended sentence[] [is] supported 
by the State and worthy of the court’s acceptance.’”460 
b. The Duty to Cooperate and Not to Hinder 
As noted previously, section 205 of the Second Restatement of 
Contracts defines the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.461 Comment d to section 205 states that 
bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair 
dealing may require more than honesty. A complete catalogue 
of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are 
among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: 
evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and 
slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse 
of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to 
cooperate in the other party’s performance.462 
Courts have interpreted this comment and the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing to encompass both the duty to 
cooperate and the duty not to hinder. As the Court of Federal Claims 
noted in Tecom, Inc. v. United States,463 “while ‘[t]he implied duties to 
cooperate and not to hinder are two separate, albeit related, implied 
duties,’ they appear to be ‘disparate aspects’ of the overarching duty 
of good faith and fair dealing.”464 
The duty not to hinder is the obligation not to willfully or 
negligently interfere with the other party’s performance of the 
contract.465 This duty exists “because it is rarely possible to anticipate 
in contract language every possible action or omission by a party that 
undermines the bargain.”466 For instance, in Local America Bank of 
Tulsa v. United States,467 the Court of Federal Claims found that 
Congress breached the duty not to hinder by repealing a tax 
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deduction that a bank planned to use after contracting with the 
government to take over failing savings and loan institutions.468 
The duty to cooperate supplements this duty not to hinder and 
requires that the government do whatever is necessary to enable the 
contractor to perform.469 Courts have found that the government 
violates the duty to cooperate by engaging in behavior such as 
responding to a contractor’s requests in an evasive or untimely 
manner or failing to provide reasonable assistance at a contractor’s 
request.470 For example, in D’Andrea Bros. LLC v. United States,471 a 
contractor entered into an agreement with the United States Army 
Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center 
(“Natick”) to commercialize energy bars called “HooAH! Bars” that 
had been developed by Natick and were included in the operational 
rations provided to soldiers.472 The contract stated that Natick would 
help the contractor test and improve the bar.473 
Natick complied with the express terms of the contract but also 
“bad mouthed” the contractor and developed “its own bar within the 
military feeding community.”474 The Court of Federal Claims, 
however, rejected the contractor’s claim that Natick violated the duty 
not to hinder because (1) this “bad mouthing” was only done 
internally with military personnel and (2) Natick did not produce its 
new bar for the commercial market.475 
Conversely, the court found that Natick did fail “to cooperate 
with [the contractor] during a significant period of the [contract] 
term” by (1) changing the internal name of the HooAh! Bar to the 
“First Strike” bar and (2) failing to communicate with the contractor 
through their “key contacts” for a period of months.476 According to 
the court, “the government’s actions destroyed plaintiff’s reasonable 
expectation that the parties would work cooperatively to develop and 
commercialize the HooAH! energy bar that would be the same or 
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similar to the bars available in military rations.”477 Therefore, the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing covers the affirmative 
duty to cooperate in addition to the duty not to hinder. 
c. Applying the Implied Covenant to Presentation of Sentencing 
Recommendations 
The foregoing analysis makes clear that the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in the government contract context 
contains both “the affirmative duty to cooperate .	.	. and the negative 
obligation not to hinder or delay performance” by engaging in 
conduct that undermines the bargain.478 Under Benchimol and its 
progeny, courts have applied the duty not to hinder to plea 
agreements by concluding that a prosecutor cannot express personal 
reservations about plea agreements in a way that undermines her 
promised sentencing recommendation.479 
Arguably, however, the vast majority of courts have not applied 
the duty to cooperate in the plea-bargaining context. Since 
Benchimol, most courts have rejected claims that a prosecutor can 
breach a plea agreement based upon behavior such as offering tepid 
support for a sentencing recommendation, failing to provide the 
reason(s) for the recommendation, and even conveying information 
to the judge that could cause a harsher sentence.480 
In D’Andrea, the Court of Federal Claims found that Natick 
breached the duty to cooperate by failing to collaborate with a 
contractor so that it could commercialize the HooAh! Bar in a 
manner consistent with the contractor’s reasonable expectations.481 
The comparable question in the plea-bargaining context is whether a 
pleading defendant reasonably expects that the prosecutor will make 
his sentencing recommendation “clear[] to the sentencing judge and 
to express the justification for it.”482 While the Ninth Circuit majority 
in Benchimol answered this question in the affirmative, the dissent 
disagreed, concluding that neither the Federal Rules nor the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility imposes a duty of zeal on 
prosecutors in “fulfilling a bargain, nor could they” because “[t]he 
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defendant is not the prosecutor’s client.”483 The Supreme Court later 
agreed with the dissent’s reasoning, concluding that Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11 did not suggest the implied-in-law 
requirement that the prosecutor clearly make a sentencing 
recommendation and express the justification for it.484 
While the Benchimol Court was correct that Rule 11 does not 
imply that prosecutors have specific obligations when making a 
sentencing recommendation, it is important to note that the Due 
Process Clause may require more than the Federal Rules. In its 1969 
opinion in Boykin v. Alabama,485 the Supreme Court held that due 
process requires that the record contain affirmative evidence that the 
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded guilty 
even though no such requirement existed in Rule 11.486 Subsequently, 
Rule 11 was amended in 1974 to require judges to ensure that 
defendants understand both the rights they are waiving by pleading 
guilty and the consequences of guilty pleas.487 Courts across the 
country have concluded that the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing applies to plea agreements, and this Article has argued 
that this result is constitutionally required. If both of these premises 
are correct, then courts should conclude that the Due Process Clause 
obligates prosecutors to clearly make sentencing recommendations 
and express the justifications for them. 
Courts could reach this conclusion despite the fact that the 
defendant is not the prosecutor’s client. After all, although the 
defendant is not the prosecutor’s client, the Due Process Clause 
obliges prosecutors to disclose material exculpatory evidence to 
defendants, as does Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 
3.8(d).488 Model Rule 3.8 covers “Special Responsibilities of a 
Prosecutor.”489 Comment 1 to that Rule states in relevant part that 
“[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not 
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific 
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice	
.	.	.	.”490 
 
 483. Id. at 1004 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
 484. United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455 (1985). 
 485. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
 486. Id. at 242–44; see also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464–67 (1969). 
 487. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 amendment (“The 
amendment .	.	. codifies .	.	. the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama.”). 
 488. See supra text accompanying notes 309–12.  
 489. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
 490. Id. at cmt. 1. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 31 (2018) 
88 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
Even though Rule 3.8 does not explicitly reference plea 
agreements, courts have applied it to the plea-bargaining process. For 
instance, the Supreme Court of South Dakota found that a prosecutor 
violated Rule 3.8 by including a clause in a plea agreement “calling 
for the public release of grand jury transcripts.”491 Meanwhile, the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky used Rule 3.8 to conclude that a 
prosecutor committed misconduct by including an ineffective 
assistance of counsel waiver in a plea agreement.492 According to the 
court, “[a] prosecutor is charged with ‘see[ing] that the defendant is 
accorded procedural justice,’ and we simply do not believe the use of 
IAC waivers lives up to that lofty expectation.”493 Similarly, in the 
previously mentioned Foster case, the Court of Appeals of Kansas 
concluded that a prosecutor must make clear that the recommended 
sentence in a plea agreement is “worthy or desirable”494 because of 
“the special duties and responsibilities of prosecutors, ‘whose interest 
.	.	. in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.’”495 
While the obligations of Rule 3.8 are not constitutionally 
required, there is a good argument under this Article’s thesis that the 
implied covenant and the duty to cooperate should automatically 
apply at sentencing hearings and require prosecutors to make 
sentencing recommendations clearly and express the justifications for 
them. Once again, in the absence of such an automatic application, 
courts would need to consult the three Eldridge factors. 
The same analysis applies here as applied in the substantial 
assistance motion context: (1) defendants in both contexts have a 
uniquely compelling interest in the accuracy of their criminal 
proceedings, (2) the government’s countervailing interest in both 
cases must be tempered by the interest in a fair and accurate 
adjudication of criminal cases, and (3) defendants in both situations 
face a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of their liberty that 
can easily be remedied by requiring the prosecution to act in good 
faith in presenting plea agreements at sentencing hearings. Moreover, 
while review of a prosecutor’s failure to file a substantial assistance 
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motion requires fact-finding regarding the quality and quantity of the 
defendant’s assistance, an appellate court would merely need to look 
at the sentencing hearing record to decide whether a prosecutor made 
a sentencing recommendation clearly and expressed the justifications 
for it. 
CONCLUSION 
In his dissenting opinion in Ricketts v. Adamson, Justice Brennan 
proposed the idea of plea agreements as constitutional contracts and 
lamented the fact that the Supreme Court had not yet developed clear 
rules of construction to apply in plea-bargaining disputes. This gap in 
the law still exists thirty years later, despite ninety-five percent of 
criminal cases being resolved by plea agreements. The Supreme 
Court’s case law, however, makes clear that the Due Process Clause 
applies to all parts of the plea-bargaining process and that pleading 
defendants should be treated at least as well as parties to other 
contracts. It is clear, however, that most courts treat defendants worse 
in at least three key plea-bargaining scenarios: (1) substantial 
assistance motions, (2) Brady disclosures, and (3) prosecutorial 
presentation of sentencing recommendations. Under a theory of plea 
agreements as constitutional contracts, courts should change the way 
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